Miniter's Notebook

Sunday Times (of London) reporter Christina Lamb contends that Abu Faraj al-Libi is just a mid-level player. Lamb has been wrong before. Last year, she filed a front-page story saying that Pakistani troops had cornered Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's no. 2, in a mud-brick fortresss in Pakistan. Now it turns out that he was never there. Plus, she is relying on European sources who do know al-Qaeda well in Europe, but not in South Asia. So the fact that these European experts don't know much about him is of little value. Pakistan is outside their area of expertise and I doubt that they receive intel briefings. Quoting the famous French terrorism expert Brisard doesn't establish much.

Lamb is right about one thing: the captured al-Libi and the al-Libi on the FBI's most wanted list are different men. And, no, they are not related. I pointed out that out on the Fox New Channel this past week. Remember, inside al-Qaeda, there are dozens of senior officials with al-Libi in their names. It simply means "the Libyan" and is well-worn way to distinguish one Mohammed from another in the Arab world.

While there is a real debate about Abu Faraj's role (was he no. 3 or not?) inside the intelligence community, nearly everyone seems to think that his capture was a major blow to al-Qaeda. The debate is technical and turns on whether an analyst thinks that al-Qaeda no longer has a no. 3 at the top of an organizational pyramid, but instead a chain of national al-Qaeda leaders or whether the analyst believes that the organizational structure of bin Laden's network is unchanged since 2001, but the names inside the organizational boxes have changed. And while intel analysts obsess about this, the question is essentially unknowable.

As for the New York Daily News article by James Gordon Meek, I don't think that the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi is "bigger than bin Laden." Capturing or killing bin Laden would be an enormous morale blow to the organization and would probably facture it. Remember, al-Qaeda is not a monolithic entity or interchangeable parts like the U.S. Army. The terror network is divided along ethnic lines. The Yemenis train with and take orders from Yemenis; the Saudis train with Saudis and so on. We know from interogations of captured terrorists that these ethnic groups inside al-Qaeda can be bitter rivals. Only the force of bin Laden's personality and his aura of invicibility holds the organization together.

Still the capture of al-Libi is significant. It removes a senior al-Qaeda officer who was plotting to kill the prime minister of Pakistan, America's most vital ally in the war on terror. Of the more than 3000 al-Qaeda killed or captured since September 11^th, more than 700 have been captured in Pakistan. Also, al-Libi would have operational knowledge of plots around the world—and the names and locations of dozens of key al-Qaeda leaders. The effect of his arrest will ripple around the world.